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SMITH, Chief Judge.    
 
This consolidated appeal involves issues tangential to 
the expansive National Football League (NFL) concussion 
injury litigation.  Following approval of the settlement 
agreement in that class action in 2015, various class members 
entered into cash advance arrangements with third party 
litigation funders.  Under the agreements relevant to the cases 
on appeal, class members purported to assign their rights to a 
portion of their settlement proceeds in exchange for receipt of 
immediate cash.   
In December 2017, Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
Judge Anita Brody, who had presided over the NFL class 
action and retained jurisdiction while the settlement was being 




entirety all of the assignment agreements.  The District Court1 
explained that its ruling was necessary to protect vulnerable 
class members from predatory funding companies.  Appellants 
RD, Atlas, and Thrivest, three groups of litigation funding 
entities,2 now appeal that order and other related orders entered 
by the District Court.   
We commend Judge Brody for her very able handling 
throughout this extraordinarily complicated class action and 
settlement, and we appreciate her steadfast commitment to 
protecting class members’ rights.  In this instance, though, 
despite having the authority to void prohibited assignments, the 
District Court went too far in voiding the cash advance 
agreements in their entirety and voiding contractual provisions 
that went only to a lender’s right to receive funds after the 
player acquired them.  Accordingly, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part in case 18-1040.  We will dismiss cases 18-
1639, 18-2582, and 18-1482 for lack of jurisdiction.  We will 
vacate and remand in cases 18-2184 and 18-3005. 
                                              
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the term “District Court” refers 
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and, specifically, Judge Brody. 
2 Appellants in 18-1040 and 18-1482 are RD Legal Funding 
Partners, L.P; RD Legal Finance, LLC; RD Legal Funding, 
LLC; and Roni Dersovitz (RD, or RD entities).  Appellants in 
18-1639 are Atlas Legal Funding, LLC; Atlas Legal Funding 
I, LP; Atlas Legal Funding II, LP; and Atlas Legal Funding III, 
LP (Atlas, or Atlas entities).  Appellant in 18-2184, 18-2582, 





In early 2012, MDL 2323 was formed to handle claims 
that had been filed by former professional football players 
against the NFL based on concussion-related injuries.  On May 
8, 2015, the District Court entered a final order certifying a 
class of former NFL players and approving the parties’ final 
settlement agreement.  This Court affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment and upheld both the settlement and the certification 
of the class for settlement purposes.  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 
2016).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari review, Gilchrist 
v. Nat’l Football League, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016); Armstrong v. 
Nat’l Football League, 137 S. Ct. 607 (2016), and the 
settlement went into effect on January 7, 2017. 
Under the settlement agreement, approximately 
200,000 class members gave up their claims in exchange for 
potential proceeds from an uncapped settlement fund.  In order 
to receive an award, a class member must first submit a claim 
package including medical records reflecting a qualifying 
diagnosis, among other things.  The Claims Administrator then 
conducts a preliminary review for deficiencies, investigates the 
claim as appropriate, and makes a determination as to whether 
the class member qualifies for a monetary award.  Either the 
class member or the NFL can then appeal the monetary award 
determination.  Only after any appeals are completed does the 
Claims Administrator pay out the individual’s award. 
In March 2017, the claims submission process opened 
for class members who had been diagnosed with a qualifying 
illness prior to January 7, 2017.  The first payouts for this group 
of players took place in mid-2017.  Individuals without a 




diagnosis from a practitioner approved through the settlement 
Baseline Assessment Program (BAP).  Class members could 
begin registering for appointments through the BAP system in 
June 2017.  Thus, after entering into the settlement in May 
2015, class members waited at least two years, and often 
longer, before receiving their awards. 
While waiting to receive their awards, hundreds of class 
members entered into cash advance agreements with dozens of 
litigation funding companies, including the three groups of 
funding entities who are appellants here.  Under the 
agreements relevant to this appeal, class members purported to 
“assign” their rights to a portion of their settlement proceeds in 
exchange for immediate cash.  The amount of proceeds 
assigned and the cash received varied with each class 
member’s contract.  The effective interest rate, calculated by 
comparing the amount of money assigned with the amount of 
money received, also varied significantly among the contracts. 
Under the agreements entered into by the Atlas entities 
and Thrivest, the funding companies obtained no right to 
submit a claim directly to the Claims Administrator and instead 
acquired only the right to receive settlement funds after the 
Claims Administrator had paid out the awards to the particular 
class members with whom they contracted.  Under the RD 
entity agreements, the funding companies purported to obtain 
both the right to collect directly from the Claims Administrator 
and the right to collect after the award was paid out to the class 
member.3  Under all of the agreements relevant to this appeal, 
class members expressly did not assign their legal claims 
against the NFL, nor did the funding companies acquire the 
                                              
3 RD has since stated that it has made no attempt to collect 




right to assert legal claims.  See, e.g., Atlas App. 890 (“[T]he 
Purchaser is in no way acquiring the Seller’s right to sue.”). 
Importantly, the May 2015 final settlement agreement 
included a provision under which Judge Brody broadly 
retained jurisdiction over administration of the settlement: 
Section 27.1  Pursuant to the Final Order and 
Judgment, the Court will retain continuing and 
exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties and their 
counsel, all Settlement Class Members, the 
Special Master, BAP Administrator, Claims 
Administrator, Liens Resolution Administrator, 
Appeals Advisory Panel, Appeals Advisory 
Panel Consultants, and Trustee with respect to 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  Any 
disputes or controversies arising out of, or 
related to, the interpretation, implementation, 
administration, and enforcement of this 
Settlement Agreement will be made by motion to 
the Court.  In addition, the Parties, including 
each Settlement Class Member, are hereby 
deemed to have submitted to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of this Court for any suit, action, 
proceeding, or dispute arising out of, or relating 
to, this Settlement Agreement.  The terms of the 
Settlement Agreement will be incorporated into 
the Final Order and Judgment of the Court, 
which will allow that Final Order and Judgment 
to serve as an enforceable injunction by the Court 
for purposes of the Court’s continuing 




The settlement agreement also included an anti-assignment 
provision: 
Section 30.1  No Assignment of Claims.  Neither 
the Settlement Class nor any Class or Subclass 
Representative or Settlement Class Member has 
assigned, will assign, or will attempt to assign, to 
any person or entity other than the NFL Parties 
any rights or claims relating to the subject matter 
of the Class Action Complaint.  Any such 
assignment, or attempt to assign, to any person 
or entity other than the NFL Parties any rights or 
claims relating to the subject matter of the Class 
Action Complaint will be void, invalid, and of no 
force and effect and the Claims Administrator 
shall not recognize any such action. 
The District Court incorporated all of the settlement terms into 
its final order dismissing the case. 
Following approval of the settlement, the District Court 
and class counsel took various steps to address cash advance 
agreements.  In July 2016, class counsel first sent a letter to the 
class warning of predatory lending.  The letter advised class 
members to avoid encumbering their settlement proceeds 
whenever possible.  Atlas App. 1142 (“[I]f you are able to 
resist borrowing against any payments you might be eligible 
for under the Settlement, you should.”).  In June 2017, class 
counsel advised the Court that he was concerned with 
solicitations being sent to the class, including by high interest 
lenders, and received the Court’s permission to send another 
letter to the class regarding the practice.  In July 2017, Judge 




deceptive practices targeting the class, including solicitations 
from litigation funders. 
In an entirely separate proceeding in the Southern 
District of New York before Judge Loretta Preska, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the New 
York Attorney General challenged the business practices of the 
RD funding entities.  In that lawsuit, the Government claimed 
that RD was engaging in fraudulent lending practices through 
certain agreements related to settlement proceeds, including 
agreements with NFL class members.  A question arose in the 
CFPB lawsuit as to whether the NFL settlement agreement’s 
anti-assignment provision precluded class member 
assignments of settlement proceeds.  Judge Preska determined 
that the most efficient way to resolve that issue would be to 
“refer” the question to Judge Brody because she had presided 
over the settlement negotiations and retained jurisdiction over 
administration of the settlement.  On September 8, 2017, Judge 
Preska issued a referral letter alerting Judge Brody to the issue, 
but was careful to note that she was not transferring any portion 
of the case to Judge Brody. 
On September 19, 2017, Judge Brody conducted the 
scheduled hearing concerning deceptive practices.  After 
learning of Judge Preska’s referral letter, RD participated in the 
hearing, but other funding companies, including Atlas and 
Thrivest, were not involved.  Following the hearing, class 
counsel filed a motion requesting that any disputed portion of 
a class member’s award be withheld pending the Court’s 
determination of whether the cash advance agreements were 
enforceable.  The District Court granted Thrivest objector 
status as to the motion to withhold, and Thrivest submitted an 
opposition to class counsel’s motion, arguing in part that the 




of the third-party agreements.  The Atlas entities moved to 
intervene and submitted opposition papers, but the Court did 
not grant the motion at that time, instead denying it as moot in 
June 2018. 
On December 8, 2017, the District Court entered an 
order requiring class members to inform the Claims 
Administrator of all assignment agreements, and purporting to 
void all such agreements:  “To the extent that any Class 
Member has entered into an agreement that assigned or 
attempted to assign any monetary claims, that agreement is 
void, invalid and of no force and effect.”  RD App. 5.  The 
order further directed a procedure under which funding 
companies could accept rescission and return of the principal 
amount they had provided to class members by executing 
waivers relinquishing all rights under the agreements.  The 
District Court noted that further instructions to the Claims 
Administrator would follow.4   
The December 8, 2017 order did not make factual 
findings as to any specific agreement or the practices of any 
specific funding company.  Instead, the District Court relied on 
the anti-assignment provision in the settlement agreement and 
its own role as a fiduciary to the class as bases for entering the 
expansive order.  Although the December 8, 2017 order was 
directed broadly to all class members and all purported 
assignment agreements, and certainly affected the rights of all 
litigation funding companies that had entered into such 
                                              
4 The Court did not expressly rule on the class’s motion to 
withhold funds, but it necessarily rejected opposition 
arguments like those raised by Thrivest.  By purporting to void 
the agreements, the District Court exercised authority that 




contracts, many of the companies affected had not entered 
appearances or submitted any filings.  Nor was any hearing 
conducted apart from the initial September 19, 2017 hearing.  
The RD entities filed a timely notice of appeal as to the 
December 8, 2017 order, No. 18-1040. 
On February 20, 2018, the District Court ordered the 
Claims Administrator to disburse settlement proceeds directly 
to qualifying class members who had entered into assignment 
agreements that the Court had voided under the December 8, 
2017 order.  The RD entities filed a second timely notice of 
appeal as to the February 20 order, 18-1482.  Atlas filed a 
notice of appeal in March 2018 purporting to appeal both the 
February 20, 2018 order and the December 8, 2017 order, 18-
1639. 
On May 1, 2018, Thrivest filed a complaint to compel 
arbitration against class member William E. White in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to a cash advance 
agreement between the company and White.  Thrivest also 
initiated arbitration with the American Arbitration Association 
in Philadelphia.  On May 2, 2018, class counsel filed on the 
NFL class docket an emergency motion for a temporary 
restraining order to prevent Thrivest from pursuing arbitration.  
Judge Brody granted the motion.  Following a hearing, Judge 
Brody entered a permanent injunction on May 22, 2018, 
enjoining Thrivest from arbitrating the enforcement of its 
assignment agreement with White.  On May 29, 2018, Thrivest 
filed a timely notice of appeal, No. 18-2184.   
On June 28, 2018, Judge Brody denied as moot the 
class’s motion to withhold the disputed settlement funds.  
Thrivest filed a second notice of appeal as to that order, No. 




moot, the District Court had effectively applied the December 
8, 2017 and February 20, 2018 orders to Thrivest for the first 
time. 
The Western District of Pennsylvania later transferred 
Thrivest’s case against class member White to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  In August 2018, Judge Brody 
dismissed Thrivest’s separate lawsuit against White, citing her 
May 22, 2018 order enjoining Thrivest from pursuing 
arbitration.  Thrivest filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
dismissal, No. 18-3005.5 
II. 
Prior to reaching the merits of these appeals, we must 
address whether they are properly before this Court.  
Specifically, the consolidated appeals present jurisdictional 
issues of timeliness and appealability, each of which we will 
address in turn.   
A.  
The parties agree that the RD entities timely appealed 
both the December 8, 2017 and February 20, 2018 orders.  We 
agree.  The class argues, however, that both the Atlas entities 
                                              
5 Thrivest expressly limited its appeals to its agreement with 
class member White.  See, e.g., Thrivest Reply Br. at 1 n.1 
(“Thrivest refers to its dispute as with White (and not the Class 
or Class Counsel) because its Agreement is with White and it 
sought to arbitrate only with White.”).  Thrivest subsequently 
moved for a stay related to an agreement it entered into with 
another class member.  We denied that motion in part because 




and Thrivest failed to timely appeal some of the orders they are 
challenging.  We agree and will dismiss the relevant appeals. 
Atlas filed its notice of appeal on March 22, 2018, 
purporting to challenge both the District Court’s December 8, 
2017 order and its February 20, 2018 order.  The class contends 
that Atlas’s March 22, 2018 notice of appeal was not timely as 
to the December 8, 2017 order.  As discussed infra, we 
conclude that the December 8, 2017 order was a final, 
appealable order.  The order was clear and definite in its ruling 
that the anti-assignment provision forbade assignment of 
settlement proceeds and that any agreement was “void, invalid 
and of no force and effect.”  RD App. 5.  The order also 
specified that if the funding companies opted for rescission, 
they could receive “the amount already paid to the Class 
Member,” RD App. 5; we conclude that statement was 
sufficient for Atlas to calculate damages with reasonable 
certainty.  See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 307 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (noting that a judgment is not final until it 
reasonably resolves the extent of damages).  Accordingly, the 
Atlas entities forfeited their right to appeal the December 8, 
2017 order when they failed to file a notice of appeal within 
thirty days of that order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  
Further, although Atlas timely filed its appeal from the 
February 20, 2018 order, Atlas makes no argument in its brief 
regarding that order and has therefore forfeited any challenge 
to it.6  We will dismiss Atlas’s appeal at 18-1639 in its entirety 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
                                              
6 As explained infra, even if Atlas had not forfeited its 
arguments as to the February 20, 2018 order, we conclude that 




As to Thrivest, there is no question that the company 
timely appealed Judge Brody’s order enjoining it from 
pursuing arbitration (18-2184) and Judge Brody’s order 
dismissing the Thrivest v. White case (18-3005).  Thrivest also 
filed a notice of appeal on July 16, 2018, appealing from Judge 
Brody’s order denying as moot the motion to withhold the 
disputed settlement funds.  But in its briefing, Thrivest 
attempts to challenge not the order denying the motion to 
withhold, but rather the December 8, 2017 and February 20, 
2018 orders.  Thrivest argues that it was not until the Court’s 
June order denying the motion to withhold that Thrivest 
understood the Court’s previous orders to have decided the 
objections Thrivest raised in its November 2017 opposition.  
Thrivest argues that it therefore had no reason to believe, at the 
time those orders were entered in December 2017 and February 
2018, that they affected its rights such that appeal would be 
necessary. 
By their clear terms, the December 8, 2017 and 
February 20, 2018 orders applied to all assignment agreements 
entered into by class members, so the District Court necessarily 
rejected the arguments raised by Thrivest in its opposition 
when the Court purported to void the agreements.  To the 
extent Thrivest attempts to appeal the denial of the motion to 
withhold, it failed to brief that issue and instead addressed only 
the December 8, 2017 and February 20, 2018 orders.  Any 
argument as to the order denying the motion to withhold is 
therefore forfeited.  Further, we conclude that Thrivest cannot 
bootstrap its arguments regarding the December 8, 2017 and 
February 20, 2018 final orders to its July 16, 2018 notice of 
appeal.  Accordingly, we will dismiss as untimely Thrivest’s 





In the remaining cases that were timely appealed, 18-
1040, 18-1482, 18-2184, and 18-3005, the appellants–
litigation funders appeal four orders: (1) the December 8, 2017 
order voiding the assignment agreements; (2) the February 20, 
2018 order directing the Claims Administrator to disburse 
funds; (3) the May 22, 2018 order enjoining Thrivest from 
arbitrating the enforceability of its assignment agreement; and 
(4) the order dismissing Thrivest v. White, respectively.  We 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction to consider 
appeals of the first, third, and fourth orders under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 1292,7 but that we do not have jurisdiction over 
the appeal of the February 20, 2018 order.   
                                              
7 We also conclude that we have jurisdiction despite the fact 
that RD and Thrivest were non-parties to the District Court 
litigation.  In the usual course, only parties of record have 
standing to appeal.  IPSCO Steel (Ala.), Inc. v. Blaine Constr. 
Corp., 371 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2004).  “[A] nonparty may 
bring an appeal when three conditions are met: (1) the nonparty 
had a stake in the outcome of the proceedings that is discernible 
from the record; (2) the nonparty has participated in the 
proceedings before the district court; and (3) the equities favor 
the appeal.”  Id.  The RD entities entered appearances and 
participated in briefing in the District Court, and Thrivest was 
granted objector status.  To the extent these litigation funding 
entities were not parties below, see, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 
536 U.S. 1, 8 (2002) (“Because they were not named in the 
action, the appellants in these cases were parties only in the 
sense that they were bound by the order from which they were 




The December 8, 2017 and February 20, 2018 orders 
are not traditional “final” orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
because they did not terminate the litigation in the District 
Court.  Yet there are circumstances where finality should be 
given a “practical rather than a technical construction.”  Isidor 
Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 
150 (3d Cir. 1993).  “[T]his is especially so when 
supplementary post-judgment orders are involved because the 
policy against and the probability of avoiding piecemeal 
review are less likely to be decisive after judgment than 
before.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Under the 
collateral order doctrine, we also have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review “certain decisions that do not 
terminate the litigation . . . as final decisions of the district 
courts if they are (1) conclusive, (2) resolve important 
questions completely separate from the merits, and (3) would 
render such important questions effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.”  Russell 
v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
                                              
standing under our non-party appeal precedent.  See IPSCO 
Steel (Ala.), Inc., 371 F.3d at 153.  Both groups of litigation 
funding entities have a stake in the outcome of the proceedings 
because the District Court purported to void their agreements 
with class members, eliminating their contractual rights.  The 
companies also participated in the proceedings before the 
District Court and submitted related filings.  The equities favor 
allowing the appeal because the funding companies have no 
way to challenge the District Court’s orders, which affected 




Here, the NFL concussion litigation final judgment has 
already been appealed to, and approved by, this Court.  As a 
result, the District Court’s post-judgment orders of December 
8, 2017 and February 20, 2018 could not be appealed along 
with any future “final order,” and there is not the usual concern 
of piecemeal litigation.  At this point, however, our analysis of 
the December and February orders must diverge due to the 
fundamental differences between the two orders.  The 
December 8, 2017 order bears indicia of finality—it purported 
to void any assignment agreement in its entirety, leaving no 
additional steps for the District Court to take.  As revealed by 
the subsequent order enjoining Thrivest from pursuing 
arbitration to determine the enforceability of its agreement, the 
District Court believes that its December order fully and finally 
determined that substantive issue.  The issues presented by the 
December 8, 2017 order are also important because they 
involve freedom of contract and the authority of the District 
Court, and those questions are collateral to, and completely 
separate from, the NFL class action merits issues.  We 
therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 to consider RD’s timely appeal of the December 8, 
2017 order. 
As to the February 20, 2018 order, we conclude that the 
requisites for appeal under the collateral order doctrine are not 
satisfied.  First, as a purely administrative order, the order did 
not conclusively resolve any dispute or determine any legal 
issue, as required under the collateral order test.  See Coopers 
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (“To come 
within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final-
judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively 
determine the disputed question.”).  Instead, the District 




issues related to assignment agreements, and the February 20, 
2018 order was merely a ministerial order designed to 
effectuate the Court’s prior order.  See 15B C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 3916 (2d ed.) (“[M]any 
postjudgment orders will involve ministerial or discretionary 
matters that are effectively unreviewable.”); see also IIT v. 
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1020 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that 
while the order at issue “finally dispose[d]” of the award, the 
collateral order doctrine was not “intended to apply to the 
scores of discretionary administrative orders a district court 
must make in supervising its receiver”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010).   
Further, the February 20, 2018 order does not raise 
important issues, as required to satisfy the second collateral 
order element.  There can be no question that the February 20, 
2018 order is precisely the type of administrative order that the 
District Court plainly retained the authority to enter, as 
explained infra.  And the order did not affect the substantive 
rights of the parties, which had already been ruled upon in the 
December 8, 2017 order.  Instead, the order merely directed the 
Claims Administrator to distribute funds in a particular way.  
Such a discretionary, non-substantive decision by the District 
Court presents little for an appellate court to review, and is 
inappropriate for review under the narrow collateral order 
doctrine.  We therefore conclude that we do not have appellate 
jurisdiction to review the February 20, 2018 order, and we will 
dismiss case number 18-1482. 
The third order, enjoining Thrivest from arbitrating the 
enforceability of its assignment agreement is reviewable under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292 as an order of the District Court granting an 




subject to appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a 
traditional final order.  Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to 
address the merits in three of the four timely appeals. 
III. 8 
On appeal, the fundamental question is whether the 
District Court had the authority to void the cash advance 
agreements.  We conclude that the District Court retained 
broad authority to administer the settlement, but that the Court 
ultimately exceeded its authority in voiding the agreements in 
their entirety.   
                                              
8 “This court applies plenary review to a district court’s 
construction of settlement agreements, but should review a 
district court’s interpretation of settlement agreements, as well 
as any underlying factual findings, for clear error, as it would 
in reviewing a district court’s treatment of any other contract.”  
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 
193 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[B]asic contract principles . . . apply to 
settlement agreements [and] . . . contract interpretation is a 
question of fact, [thus] . . . review is according to the clearly 
erroneous standard.  In contrast, contract construction, that is, 
the legal operation of the contract, is a question of law 
mandating plenary review.” (alterations in Coltec))).  In this 
case, the District Court’s interpretation of the settlement 
agreement terms is properly reviewed for clear error.  The 
District Court’s conclusion as to how the settlement agreement 
applies to the assignment agreements is an issue of 





Where parties have entered into a settlement agreement 
and a district court has dismissed the case, the court retains 
jurisdiction over issues related to the case only to the extent it 
has expressly retained jurisdiction or incorporated the 
settlement agreement into its dismissal order.  Shaffer v. GTE 
N., Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, the District 
Court broadly retained jurisdiction over administration of the 
NFL class settlement and the class action parties.  The Court 
expressly incorporated the settlement agreement into the order 
approving the settlement, including the jurisdiction retention 
provision.  See supra Section I.  The District Court also 
included a second jurisdiction retention provision in the final 
order: 
The Court retains continuing and exclusive 
jurisdiction over this action including 
jurisdiction over the Parties and their counsel, all 
Settlement Class Members, the Special Master, 
BAP Administrator, Claims Administrator, Lien 
Resolution Administrator, Appeals Advisory 
Panel, Appeals Advisory Panel Consultants, and 
Trustee.  In accordance with the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement, the Court retains 
continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to 
interpret, implement, administer and enforce the 
Settlement Agreement, and to implement and 
complete the claims administration and 
distribution process.  The Court also retains 
continuing jurisdiction over any “qualified 
settlement funds,” that are established under the 




RD App. 285.  As a result, the District Court retained broad 
jurisdiction to administer the settlement and resolve issues 
relating to it.9 
Although the District Court’s retention of jurisdiction 
applied only to the parties and other related entities expressly 
set out in the retention provision—and there can be no dispute 
that the settlement agreement was not binding on nonparties—
the Court also had authority to enforce its orders under the All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, as well as authority to protect the 
class as a fiduciary under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  
Neither of these sources of authority independently create 
jurisdiction, see Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534–35 
                                              
9 The litigation funding companies argue that the District 
Court’s December 8, 2017 order was an advisory opinion 
because it answered a question “referred” to the Court by the 
Southern District of New York.  This argument is meritless.  
As an initial matter, the District Court was already aware of the 
problem of the cash advance agreements and had scheduled a 
hearing prior to the referral letter from the Southern District of 
New York.  Further, regardless of how the question of 
interpretation of the anti-assignment clause reached the District 
Court, it had retained the authority to adjudicate any issue 
related to interpretation of the settlement agreement.  This 
retained authority originated from the underlying NFL 
concussion case that was the subject of the settlement 
agreement before the District Court, so the District Court’s 
order simply could not have been an advisory opinion.  We 
have no reason to express a view as to whether it would be 
appropriate for the Southern District of New York to rely on 
Judge Brody’s order or adopt her rulings in the separate lawsuit 




(1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 82, but they both allow a court to 
exercise some degree of control over third parties in specific 
circumstances.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d 
268, 277 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1981) (The All Writs Act “extends to 
all persons who are in a position to frustrate the 
implementation of a court order or the proper administration of 
justice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Communications 
Among Parties, Counsel, and Class Members, Ann. Manual 
Complex Lit. § 21.33 (4th ed.) (“The judge has ultimate control 
over communications among the parties, third parties, or their 
agents and class members on the subject matter of the litigation 
to ensure the integrity of the proceedings and the protection of 
the class.”).   
Specifically, under the All Writs Act, action is 
authorized to the extent it is “necessary or appropriate” to 
enforce a Court’s prior orders.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1651; see also 
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977) (“This 
Court has repeatedly recognized the power of a federal court to 
issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be 
necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the 
frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of 
jurisdiction otherwise obtained.”).  Or, as this Court has 
explained it, there is authority under the Act to issue an 
injunction where such relief is “necessary, or perhaps merely 
helpful.”  Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 633 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 
1980).  This Court has similarly clarified that any remedy 
under Rule 23(d) “should be restricted to the minimum 
necessary to correct the effects of improper conduct under Rule 
23.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 310 (3d Cir. 
2005); see also Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 




provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought 
would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit 
consideration to the narrowest possible relief which would 
protect the respective parties.”). 
B.  
Pursuant to the settlement agreement and the District 
Court order approving and adopting the agreement, the District 
Court retained the authority to enforce the terms of, and 
administer, the settlement.  As noted supra, we have no doubt 
that the District Court had the authority to enter purely 
administrative orders such as the February 20, 2018 order 
directing the disbursement of funds to class members.  Our 
analysis of the December 8, 2017 order is a bit more 
complicated.  That order went beyond pure issues of settlement 
administration to adjudicate the third-party contract rights of 
litigation funding companies.  Under the All Writs Act and 
Rule 23, the District Court had authority to enjoin behavior by 
third parties to the extent necessary to effectuate and preserve 
the integrity of its prior orders.  The question becomes whether, 
to accomplish those goals, it was necessary for the District 
Court to void the cash advance agreements in their entirety in 
the December 8, 2017 order. 
The anti-assignment provision in the NFL concussion 
settlement agreement is as follows: 
Section 30.1  No Assignment of Claims.  Neither 
the Settlement Class nor any Class or Subclass 
Representative or Settlement Class Member has 
assigned, will assign, or will attempt to assign, to 
any person or entity other than the NFL Parties 




of the Class Action Complaint.  Any such 
assignment, or attempt to assign, to any person 
or entity other than the NFL Parties any rights or 
claims relating to the subject matter of the Class 
Action Complaint will be void, invalid, and of no 
force and effect and the Claims Administrator 
shall not recognize any such action. 
This provision includes express language that any assignment 
“will be void, invalid, and of no force and effect.”  That is 
precisely the type of “clear, definite and appropriate language” 
that is required to void a subsequent assignment under New 
York law, which is the law governing the settlement 
agreement.10  See Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 103 
N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 1952).  “An assignment purports to 
transfer ownership of a claim to the assignee, giving it standing 
to assert those rights and to sue on its own behalf.”  Am. 
Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 
890 F.3d 445, 454 (3d Cir. 2018); see also In re Stralem, 303 
A.D.2d 120, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (“In order for an 
assignment to be valid, the assignor must be divested of all 
control over the thing assigned.  When a valid assignment is 
made, the assignee steps into the assignor’s shoes and acquires 
whatever rights the latter had.” (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted)).  As a matter of New York law, we conclude 
that any true “assignment, or attempt to assign, . . . rights or 
claims relating to the subject matter of the Class Action 
                                              
10 The settlement agreement contains a choice of law provision 
specifying that the agreement “will be interpreted and enforced 
in accordance with the laws of the State of New York.”  




Complaint” was void ab initio under the anti-assignment 
clause. 
The question then becomes whether true assignments of 
settlement proceeds, like those reportedly in the cash advance 
agreements, qualify as assignments of “rights or claims relating 
to the subject matter of the Class Action Complaint.”  The 
District Court found that the anti-assignment provision 
language applied to assignments of proceeds.  This is a pure 
question of interpretation reviewed for clear error, see In re 
Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000), 
and we identify no clear error here.11  Accordingly, we adopt 
the District Court’s interpretation and conclude that any true 
assignments contained within the cash advance agreements—
that is, contractual provisions that allowed the lender to step 
into the shoes of the player and seek funds directly from the 
settlement fund—were void ab initio.12  
                                              
11 Even if we had concluded that the District Court’s ruling 
regarding the settlement language was a question of 
construction, subject to plenary review, see In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d at 193, we would hold that the 
quoted language includes assignments of settlement proceeds. 
12 The litigation funding companies argue that Article 9 of the 
New York Uniform Commercial Code bars enforcement of the 
anti-assignment provision.  Even assuming Article 9 of the 
New York U.C.C. applies to a class action settlement 
agreement, we are not relying on that agreement here.  Instead, 
through incorporation into the District Court’s final order, the 
settlement agreement has itself become an order, and that order 




Based on these conclusions, we also must rule that it 
was necessary to the District Court’s enforcement of the 
settlement agreement, and the enforcement of its own order 
approving and adopting the agreement, for the Court to be able 
to void any true assignments.  Otherwise, class members and 
the litigation funding companies could have undermined the 
District Court’s order by entering into prohibited assignments 
in contravention of the clear terms of the settlement agreement.  
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s December 8, 2017 
order to the extent it voided any true assignments set forth in 
the cash advance agreements.13 
In the end, however, we must conclude that the District 
Court went beyond its authority when it purported to void the 
cash advance agreements in their entirety.  The District Court 
explained that it was the Court’s obligation as fiduciary of the 
class “to enforce [the anti-assignment] provision of the 
Settlement Agreement.”  RD App. 2.  That is true, as far as it 
goes.  But to accomplish that goal, the Court had the option of 
invalidating only the assignment portions of the agreements 
                                              
companies provide no basis for invalidating a court order based 
on a U.C.C. provision.   
13 Of course, deciding whether any specific contractual 
provision is a “true” assignment or a false one requires 
examining the language of the specific contract.  In this 
instance, such an analysis is unnecessary in the District Court 
because the effect of a void true assignment and a false 
assignment, where the funding company has not obtained a 
right to submit a claim through the settlement process, is the 
same:  the Special Master will not enforce any purported 




containing true assignments and directing the Claims 
Administrator not to recognize any true assignments, without 
voiding the agreements in their entirety.  Some of the 
agreements contained severance clauses or alternative loan 
agreements, and there is a dispute as to whether the purported 
assignments in the funding agreements were true assignments 
at all.14  Accordingly, there are portions of the cash advance 
agreements that may be enforceable even after any true 
assignments are voided.  Of course, once the funds are 
disbursed to the players, the District Court’s power over the 
funds—and any contracts affecting the funds—is at an end. 
Further, although true assignments, which allow a 
litigation funding company to step into the shoes of a class 
member and pursue the class member’s rights through the 
claims process, would clearly violate the anti-assignment 
provision and would affect the administration of the settlement, 
something less than a true assignment may not.  For example, 
there is no dispute that a loan transaction between a class 
member and a third party is not prohibited under the terms of 
the settlement.  And where a class member enters into a non-
                                              
14 See, e.g., RD App. 338 (CFPB complaint in S.D.N.Y. 
pleading that “Although RD mischaracterizes these 
transactions as ‘assignments,’ they are in fact offers to extend 
credit or extensions of credit for purposes of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010”); RD App. 347 (CFPB 
complaint in S.D.N.Y. pleading that “Although RD 
characterizes its contracts as ‘sales and assignments,’ the 
transactions are loans under New York law”); RD App. 566 
(Class counsel noting at 9/19/17 hearing, “Although they have 
been disguised in some ways as an assignment of a property 




assignment cash advance agreement, such an agreement could 
be structured like a loan, which would not seem to affect 
administration of the settlement or violate the anti-assignment 
provision.  The District Court’s authority certainly does not 
extend to how class members choose to use their settlement 
proceeds after they are disbursed.  The District Court made no 
findings indicating that any aspects of the cash advance 
agreements, other than assignments, impaired the integrity of 
the settlement process.  As such, to the extent the District 
Court’s December 8, 2017 order voided the cash advance 
agreements in their entirety, the order was not narrowly 
tailored to the Court’s findings regarding the impact of the 
agreements on the settlement.15 
                                              
15 It is unclear whether the District Court believes it voided the 
agreements in their entirety and made them completely 
unenforceable.  The express terms of the December 8, 2017 
order indicate that was the Court’s intent.  Subsequent orders, 
such as the May 22, 2018 order enjoining Thrivest from 
pursuing arbitration, also indicate that the Court believed it had 
voided the agreements in their entirety.  At another time, 
however, the District Court noted:  “No judgment as to whether 
RD Legal is or is not ultimately entitled to money has been 
made by the Court.”  RD App. 863 n.1.   Similarly, in its 
opposition to Thrivest’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, the 
class stated that Thrivest can pursue enforcement of its funding 
agreement after the funds are paid to the class member:  “Once 
Mr. Andrews is actually paid on his claim, only then will the 
district court’s authority end and Thrivest be able to assert all 
its legal claims against Mr. Andrews.”  February 26, 2019 




In sum, although the District Court had the authority to 
enforce the clear terms of the settlement agreement by ordering 
that any true assignments are void and unenforceable, the 
Court did not have the authority to void other obligations under 
the cash advance agreements, particularly without affording 
the lenders notice and a hearing, or making specific findings 
that those obligations violated the Court’s prior orders or 
would impair the Court’s administration of the settlement.  We 
will therefore reverse in part the District Court’s December 8, 
2017 order.  As a result, the cash advance agreements remain 
enforceable—outside of the NFL claims administration 
context—to the extent the litigation companies retain rights 
under the agreements after any true assignments are voided. 
C.  
We express no opinion as to the ultimate enforceability 
of any of the cash advance agreements.  We do note, though, 
that a court or arbitrator subsequently adjudicating these issues 
will need to address whether any individual agreement 
contains a true assignment and whether there remain 
enforceable rights under the agreement after any true 
assignment is voided.  We presume that the full array of 
standard contract defenses will also apply in any subsequent 
litigation regarding these agreements.  As noted by Judge 
Brody in her December 8, 2017 order, some of the class 
members are cognitively impaired, and it is possible that some 
of them lacked the capacity to contract at the time they entered 
into the agreements.16  Judge Brody’s concern is well-taken.  
                                              
16 Counsel for the class conceded at oral argument that the class 
was not making an argument on appeal that class members 




There may also be issues of unconscionability, fraud, or usury 
based on the high effective interest rates in the agreements and 
arguments by both class counsel and the CFPB that the 
agreements are disguised predatory loans, rather than true 
assignments.  Because many of the agreements contain 
arbitration provisions, some of these issues may ultimately be 
subject to arbitration.  Of course, these are all questions beyond 
the scope of the appeal before us, and they should be litigated 
(or perhaps arbitrated) on a case-by-case basis in an 
appropriate forum.   
D.  
Finally, it necessarily follows from our rulings limiting 
the reach of the December 8, 2017 order that the District Court 
exceeded its authority when it (1) enjoined Thrivest from 
pursuing arbitration of its rights under the cash advance 
agreement with class member White, and (2) dismissed 
Thrivest’s lawsuit attempting to enforce that agreement.  In 
entering those orders, the District Court relied on the fact that 
it had already invalidated the Thrivest agreement.  But as we 
explained above, Thrivest’s contract gave it only the right to 
receive settlement funds after the funds are disbursed to a class 
member, and the District Court’s power over the funds and 
class ends at that point.  Supra Parts I & III.B.  Even if the 
parties had attempted to create a true assignment, we have held 
that the District Court did not have the authority to void 
Thrivest’s agreement with White in its entirety.  Thus it also 
did not have the authority to preclude Thrivest from litigating 
any of its remaining rights under the agreement.  We therefore 
                                              
20.  Of course, this concession for purposes of this appeal will 
not be binding against class members in subsequent litigation 




vacate the District Court’s May 22, 2018 order enjoining 
Thrivest from pursuing arbitration and the Court’s order 
dismissing Thrivest’s complaint in Thrivest v. White, and 
remand for further proceedings, as appropriate. 
IV.  
For the reasons given, we will reverse in part and affirm 
in part the District Court’s December 8, 2017 order.  We will 
reverse to the extent the District Court purported to void the 
cash advance agreements in their entirety and void contractual 
provisions that went only to a lender’s right to receive funds 
after the player acquired them.  We will affirm as to the District 
Court’s ruling that any true assignments—contractual 
provisions that permit the lender to seek funds directly from 
the Claims Administrator—are void.  We will vacate the 
District Court’s May 22, 2018 order enjoining Thrivest from 
pursuing arbitration and the District Court’s order dismissing 
Thrivest’s complaint in Thrivest v. White, and remand for 
further proceedings.  We will dismiss the appeals at 18-1639, 
18-2582, and 18-1482 for lack of jurisdiction. 
Going forward, the litigation funding companies will be 
able to pursue, outside of the claims administration process, 
whatever rights they may continue to have under their cash 
advance agreements with class members.  We offer no opinion 
as to the companies’ prospects for success in enforcing the 
funding agreements.  Indeed, our opinion today should in no 
way suggest that an individual agreement is enforceable.  Any 
questions going to the enforceability of the funding agreements 
will have to be litigated or arbitrated in the appropriate fora. 
 
